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In 2012, hIstorIan roger MarkwIck wrote, "The Second World War has never ended for the citizens of the former Soviet Union." He claims that despite the challenges to the legacy from outside Russia, "it continues to strike a real resonance with the individual life and death experiences and memories of millions of former Soviet citizens."
1 I argue the opposite, that today the war has little or no meaning for the vast majority of the Russian population. It lost most of its utility for the government with the demise of communism and the breakup of the Soviet Union and the rest has gone by the way with the birth of a generation that never knew communism or experienced the Soviet Union. Thus it follows that Putin's attempt to use the legacy of the war to rally a rather fragmented Russian people behind his policies in the name of patriotism and to substitute for lack of vision is a waste of time and a failed use of history for political purposes.
What do we mean by legacy, and why is it worth talking about seventytwo years after the end of World War II? The dictionary located in the dock on my computer gives two definitions of legacy. The first is a noun: "A thing handed down by a predecessor"; the second, in the jargon of the computer world is an adjective "denoting software or hardware that has been superseded but is difficult to replace because of its wide use." Both of these definitions have meaning when we analyze the legacy of the Second World War for Putin's Russia. Following the disintegration of the USSR, some things handed down from the war have disappeared, foremost among them are great power status and the political and economic domination of Eastern Europe. Other things such as collective trauma and an acute gender imbalance of the war generation have mercifully passed or have significantly diminished. What remains is a landscape cluttered with thousands of monuments to the war scattered across the former USSR and Eastern Europe, the dwindling remnants of the war generation who feel entitled to public subsidies and are simultaneously idealized and neglected by the state, expatriate communities of Russians in all the former Soviet republics, and a contest over what meaning should be taken from the war as it applies to contemporary society, politics, and diplomacy. It is this contest over the meaning of the war that fits the computer scientist's adjective of legacy, "software or hardware that has been superseded but is difficult to replace because of its wide use."
Before the disintegration of the USSR, the meaning of the war passed through several distinct interpretive phases dependent on who was in power in the Kremlin. Despite their variations, each phase included the ideas that the USSR bore the greatest burden of defeating Hitler's Germany in cost of lives and destruction of property and that because the USSR liberated Eastern Europe from fascism it was therefore entitled to dominate it as a bloc. 2 It was understood that the victory validated the rule of the Communist Party, the Soviet social system despite their failures, and, until his death, the rule of Stalin.
Leonid Brezhnev subsequently used the legacy of the war to justify his regime despite its failures, which led to cynicism and then finally to its first critical re-evaluation under Gorbachev.
3 Like his Soviet predecessors, Putin has taken an active role in pushing a re-interpretation of the legacy that supports his domestic political agenda and foreign policy, but, unlike during the Soviet era, it has not gone uncontested. The state's version under Putin faces competing narratives and has served as the basis for attacks on his governance and foreign policy and has created international tensions.
The interpretation of the meaning and legacy of their so-called "Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union," adopted by Putin and the political right in Russia borrows from the original legacy that Russia (rarely mentioning the USSR) bore the major share of the load in defeating Nazi Germany; now Russian revisionism means that they won the war and "saved the world from Nazi Domination." 4 Following from this, the world, most specifically the European Union, the former states of the USSR, and the United States, should be more respectful of Russia, give it its due, and especially defer to its foreign policy agenda in the near abroad. In 2014, Putin began to use the legacy of the war to justify the attacks on the Ukraine to the international community and the Russian population, by slapping the label "fascist" on it.
It is apparent that the Putin government has an agenda regarding how it portrays the legacy of the war to the nation, now three generations past the "great victory." It wants to use the war to promote patriotism and national pride in a Russia that has yet to produce contemporary heroes or heroic events. In so doing, Putin has inconsistently shifted credit for the victory from Stalin and the Communist Party and assigned it to the Russian people. He is trying to use the memory of the war and its enormous sacrifice to build unity among the people on the basis of shared suffering. He wants to use the legacy of suffering to create distance between the Russian people and the West by portraying the EU, NATO, the former Soviet satellite states, and the former Soviet republics, particularly the Baltic States and the Ukraine, as being ungrateful and perhaps even pro-fascist.
Since his first election to office, nearly every national holiday has been manipulated to celebrate or commemorate the Great Patriotic War. He has even gone so far as to use the former celebration of the October Revolution on November 7, redefined as National Unity Day since 2004, to celebrate the war. In 2011, he had soldiers clad in period uniforms, and armed and equipped with period weapons and vehicles, recreate the famous 1941 parade in which soldiers marched through the capital directly to the front during the Battle for Moscow. To top it off, he had a handful of aged survivors of the Battle of Moscow who had marched in 1941 ride in trucks in the parade.
5 By appropriating the day in this manner, he has offended Russia's communists and many of the older generation who still think well of Lenin and feel nostalgia for the Soviet period. 6 So far Putin's record on communicating this message is mixed. For the younger generations born after the disintegration of the USSR, it is just stories of which many have grown tired. Although the history of the war is part of the national school curriculum, evidently students are not paying close attention to their lessons. On 21 June 2002, the day before the celebration of the Day of Memory and Sorrow, which commemorates the German invasion in 1941, a public opinion poll was taken to see how many people knew the significance of the next day's date. Only 18 % responded correctly. 7 This lack of knowledge may be in part due to the fact that under Yeltsin the national school curriculum reduced the number of lessons on World War II in high school from twenty to only eight. 8 In 2011, Moscow Humanitarian University published the results of a study it conducted about the feelings of Russian youth regarding the heroism of Soviet soldiers in the Great Patriotic War. Eight hundred students from various universities across Russia were polled. Only 14% of the respondents correctly identified Josef Stalin as the supreme commander of the Red Army during the war. When asked to name other prominent figures of the war many students correctly thought of Hitler and Roosevelt, but nearly 37% of those surveyed could not name even one important person. Nearly half of those surveyed (47%) could not think of a single hero of World War II. Despite their lack of factual historical knowledge 96% of those polled believed that they should be proud of Russia's role in the Great Patriotic War, and 82 % believed it was necessary to continue to hold Victory Day parades. 9 The support for Victory Day celebrations does not mean that people necessarily accord them reverence. Alcohol finally had to be banned from the St. Petersburg celebrations in 2014 because the annual festivities have frequently turned into drunken melees during the fireworks.
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As for major battles or campaigns, a quarter of respondents claimed no knowledge of the battles of Moscow, Stalingrad, and Kursk. Just over half (54%) had heard of the siege of Leningrad, and only one third (35%) of students knew there had been a battle for Berlin. Fully 25% of the students polled equated the Great Patriotic War with the First World War and Napoleon's invasion in 1812 as being so far past as to be irrelevant to contemporary life. 11 In sum, the survey shows that the Great Patriotic War is well on the way to becoming legendary to young people.
It is far from clear that Putin understands or appreciates how the generation gap has affected the level of reverence for the war in contemporary society. Putin may be blinded by his own emotional attachment to the legacy of the war, which no doubt is shared by many. His father served in the Red Army for the duration of the war, and his mother was a survivor of the siege of Leningrad. On January 1, 2014, to commemorate the siege of Leningrad, Putin led a procession of siege survivors to the Piskarëvskoe cemetery where he laid a wreath in honor of his brother who just recently, it was announced, was buried there. 12 There can be no doubt that the shadow of the war shaded his childhood.
The gap between Putin's and his generation's attachment to the war and their sense of patriotism and that of Russia's younger generation is illustrated by the minor uproar caused by 24-year-old Natalia Pereverzeva, Russia's candidate for Miss Earth, crowned in November 2012 who answered the following to the question of what made her proud of Russia:
My Russia is a beautiful and majestic lady, full-blooded, redcheeked, wearing an embroidered sundress and a long, thick braid, with multi-colored ribbons in it. She is a fabulous girl. My Russia is a cow with huge eyes and funny horns that always chews something. Oh, and how sweet its milk is! But my Russia is also a poor, huge and suffering country that has been ruthlessly torn by greedy, dishonest atheists. My Russia is a big artery, from which a few people take away her wealth. My Russia is a beggar. My Russia cannot help the elderly and orphans. It is bleeding and sinking like a ship, and engineers, doctors, and teachers escape from this ship because they have nothing to live on. My Russia is an endless war in the Caucasus. These embittered brotherly nations that previously spoke the same language, which is now forbidden to teach in schools. My Russia is the winner that destroyed fascism and bought the victory at the expense of millions of lives.
This was not the expression of national pride that Putin and the conservative element in Russia wanted to hear.
Linking the legacy of the war to bolster contemporary patriotism has been a goal of the Putin administrations from the beginning (Putin chose Victory Day-9 May-for his first inauguration). A Levada Center poll, taken in November 2013, revealed that the proportion of Russians who consider themselves patriots had dropped 8% since President Vladimir Putin first took office in 2000. In 2000, 77% of respondents identified themselves as patriotic, whereas in 2013 that number had dropped to 69%. How one defined patriotism determined how one responded to the poll. Those who interpreted patriotism as "working or acting for the good of the country" dropped to 21% in 2013 from 35% in 2000. Russians who understood the concept as "loving your country" remained consistent at just under 60%. Those who thought that "patriotism meant considering one's own nation better than other countries," increased only marginally from 17% in 2000 to 21% in 2013.
14 For all of Putin's use of the legacy of the war to promote patriotism it does not seem to be showing positive results. In a subsequent Levada Center poll of 1,603 Russians conducted in February, after the 2014 Winter Olympic games, the number of people who agree that a "patriot should defend the country from any kind of insults and criticism" has dropped from 24% in 2000 to 18% in 2014. However, over the same time period, the number of respondents who interpreted patriotism as the personal feeling of love for one's homeland increased from 58 to 68%. Most ominously for Putin was the disparity in numbers between those who did or did not agree with the statement that "a patriot should support the authorities no matter what"; 23.3% agreed, but 65.3% disagreed.
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How relevant the emotional legacy of the Great Patriotic War is for Russian patriotism today is impossible to quantify, but if willingness to serve in the armed forces is an indicator, then the war surely has become irrelevant to draft-aged men. Draft evasion has been a problem since the disintegration of the USSR. Rates of evasion remain extremely high despite all efforts to promote patriotism. In 2012, the Defense Ministry estimated that 200,000 men had evaded the draft and a further 244,000 dodged service in 2013. 16 The examples of sacrifice and heroism of the Great Patriotic War veterans held out as models for youth to emulate has apparently not made the desired impression. Contemporary Russian youth is decidedly unmilitary in its attitude toward service.
Veterans as Instruments of PatrIotIsm
Veterans, as living legacies of the war, have proved to be both a blessing and a curse to the Putin administration in its artless attempts to glorify the war in the name of national pride. Only since Putin has been in power has the Russian government publicly held up veterans as living role models for Russia to promote pride and unity. Speaking in Volgograd in 2003, on the 60 th anniversary of the conclusion of the Battle of Stalingrad, Putin said: "The experience of the unity that was demonstrated during the Great Patriotic War is especially valuable at present, when extremism and terrorism are rearing their heads in the world."
17 Three months later in a speech on Victory Day in 2003 Putin said: "May 9 th will always remain a glorious historic date: it reminds us of the prowess of the fighters who defeated fascism and saved humanity from slavery. The glorious memory of the feat of arms and labor of our compatriots for the sake of freedom and the happiness of future generations is still fresh in the hearts of all peoples. I'm convinced that the power and unity that our peoples demonstrated during the war years will be a good example for future generations to follow." 18 Newspapers regularly publish a plethora of interviews of veterans around all the milestone dates associated with the war or national holidays. During the rest of the year, however, there is virtually no mention of them. It is as though veterans cease to exist except on those dates. 19 Unfortunately, both for the veterans and Putin, he has sworn to fulfill the promises of social support for these men that they never received under the Soviet regime, yet he has been as unable or some argue, as unwilling, to come through as the Soviets had been. In the process Putin has validated the expectations of veterans yet discredited his government in an environment of free speech where observant critics can point out that his actions do not correspond to his words. 20 Even as he has raised their expectations, Putin tells veterans that the main reward for their suffering was the victory itself, and that whatever suffering they currently experience, it is minor compared to the war experience, as if to minimize the import of their complaints and deflate their expectations.
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Rather than simply basking in the glory of the victory and in the praise showered on them three or four times a year, veterans vent their anger at the continuing failure of the government to deliver to them benefits, at the level to which they feel entitled. Their claims of neglect are regularly covered in the newspapers, broadcast news, and internet news sources around every holiday associated with the war. 22 Veterans regularly take their grievances to court to sue local, regional, or the national govern-ment, citing the various legal statutes guaranteeing them apartments and pensions, in the hopes that their suits will result in concrete action. 23 In 2011, one veteran sent his medals back to Moscow to protest the government's failure to provide him adequate housing. 24 The widespread clamor for government benefits may be a factor in part due to the perception of a growing lack of respect for elderly people in Russia. A poll taken in December 2013 revealed that 75% felt that old people were not respected in Russia. 25 These old people constitute the war generation. The glorification of the war and veterans, and the very public complaints of the veterans about their unfulfilled entitlements has gotten to the point where it has begun to breed cynicism-typically among young people. Lament after lament of the dwindling respect among youth for veterans and for the absence of knowledge of and gratitude for the victory are voiced by veterans and fill the media.
26 When a new memorial cemetery solely for veterans was opened in Moscow on 22 June 2013, a young journalist described it sarcastically in her blog as a "pet cemetery." This resulted in a predictable wave of indignant protest from veterans. 27 This again shows that as Putin strengthens his connection with the older generation referencing the war fails to bring the younger generation to his side.
other comPlIcatIons to the legacy: PoPular culture, other wars, stalIn Popular culture, in the form of film, does not always support the heroic version of the legacy Putin wants to convey either. Some movies are predictable action thrillers in which the Red Army is clearly in the right and the Nazis are pure evil. But for the last twenty-five years or so, more often than not screenwriters and directors are portraying the war as a far more complex event with myriad characters that do not fit neatly into the former narrative that treated all soldiers as heroes and the population as long suffering but unfailingly patriotic. Issues of collaboration and the moral dilemmas faced by Soviet citizens under occupation, the continuing repression by the secret police, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) during the war, as well the sometimes ambivalent nature of what constitutes patriotism or cowardice and who truly was the enemy leave the viewer uncertain as to who or what was right or wrong. These issues make it hard to embrace the war as an absolute anchor of identity for the contemporary Russian. Putin's attempts to highlight Russia's unity, suffering, and glory in World War II has to compete not only with all the entertainment provided by popular culture, but also with calls to honor veterans and the memory of other wars. Afghan veterans, who want to be acknowledged as patriots who did their duty, have formed the Organization of Afghan War Veterans to represent them collectively. The 25 th anniversary of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan was marked with a ceremony at the Poklonnaia Gora war memorial in Moscow. Simultaneously, a special exhibition dedicated to the Afghan war was established at the Central Museum of the Great Patriotic War. 29 It is worth noting that the ceremony and exhibit to honor Afghan war vets are at sites of commemoration of the Great Patriotic War. Similarly, veterans of the Chechen Wars have formed an organization called "Soldat," to lobby for similar social guarantees allotted to veterans of the Great Patriotic War.
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Another complicating factor for Putin is how to place Stalin in the legacy of the war. Stalin's crimes against the people make it problematic to use him-the victorious war leader-as a symbolic rallying point to create a new Russian national identity. Putin, reflecting an uncertain national sentiment, seems conflicted and has been inconsistent in his stance on if or how to credit Stalin for his contribution. At times Putin has been soft on Stalin, portraying him as a unifying figure for the nation, but more recently he prefers not to mention him, the Communist Party or the USSR when speaking of the war, after having denounced him in 2010 for the Katyn murders. 31 This has caused a backlash from the Communist Party, which insists on crediting all three for the victory. Others, particularly victims of Stalinist repression, object to sanitizing Soviet history by writing Stalin out and want to claim that the victory was won in spite of him. 32 It is also a problem that a considerable number of people still see Stalin in a positive light regarding his role as commander in chief during the Great Patriotic War. A poll conducted in 2005 revealed that only 11% of respondents viewed Stalin's role in the war in a negative light while 58% believed he made a major contribution to the victory. 33 What we see then, is Putin feeling the need to honor Stalin somehow, without being tarred by the negatives of Stalinism. He has avoided trumpeting Stalin's wartime role yet simultaneously does not deny that Stalin played an important part in the victory.
comPetIng InterPretatIons of the legacy
Putin also has had to contend with competing interpretations of the legacy of the war. The Russian Orthodox Church gives God, the faith of the Russian people, and itself credit for the victory. Inferring that the enemies of the church were both Nazis and communists, one newspaper article proclaimed in 2006 that: "Russia obtained the victory by prayers. And the lives that the country sacrificed during fighting and in the rear areas were necessary for establishing the Truth [of God] in the country and for the regeneration of people's souls."
34 The Church's interpretation fully rejects the communists' historic claims that the Party saved the nation. Theirs is also a challenge to the line pushed by the Russian right and supported by Putin, which praises Russian patriotism and loyalty to the state.
Also troublesome for Putin and the image of the war he is trying to propound are Russia's monarchists, who have their own political party, "For Faith and Fatherland." They want to formally rehabilitate General Vlasov, who was recruited out of a German POW camp in 1943 to form the anti-Soviet Russian Army of Liberation with volunteers from amongst Russian POWs. He was convicted of treason and hanged in 1946. 35 Making heroes of Russians who fought for Germany against the Red Army and communism would undermine the image of Russian national unity under the leadership of a strong state that Putin is trying to maintain.
Then there is outright rejection of the legacy by the radical right in Russian society. Russia has a National Socialist Party, which uses Nazilike insignia for its symbol. The fringe right, represented by the National State Party of Russia (NDPR) espouses racist, nationalist policies. Skinheads wearing Nazi regalia and emblems march through the streets and brutalize national minorities and foreigners with relative impunity. 36 They embrace the very values that the Russian people defeated and discredited in the Great Patriotic War.
There are also those who protest Putin's current policy in the Crimea and Ukraine by incorporating a rejection of his use of the legacy of World War II to promote patriotism. On September 2, 2014, a protester in St. Petersburg dressed in the colors of the Russian flag and tied her wrists with George ribbons-a popular symbol of the victory. 37 With her hands painted red as with blood she cried out against Russian aggression in Ukraine. The SS veterans referred to themselves as fighters for freedom, which Russia described as blasphemous. 40 Also to Russia's dismay, in March 2009, Latvians publicly celebrated the anniversary of the forming of the 15 th and 19 th Latvian Waffen SS divisions. Although the Latvian government has banned the veterans of these divisions from holding parades, they do so anyway without interfer-ence. Russian-speaking anti-fascist organizations regularly protest these marches to no avail. Then, in 2010, the Latvian government successfully prosecuted Vasily Kononov, leader of a pro-Soviet commando unit in Latvia in 1944, for murder. He was convicted of killing nine civilians. To Russia's consternation, the European Court of Human Rights upheld the ruling. 41 Taking it one step further, Latvia also holds annual commemorations of its anti-Soviet partisans who fought Soviet reoccupation for several years after the war. The Russian government objects to the Latvian and Estonian claims that the Soviet occupation of their countries was worse than that of the Germans. 42 Evidently Russia's protests fell on deaf ears. In 2012, the Latvian town of Bauska erected a monument to the Latvian Legion of the Waffen SS, which bore an inscription dedicating it to "Bauska's Defenders Against the Second Soviet Occupation." 43 Both galling and irksome for Putin is that Europe in general is rejecting the aspect of the legacy that justified Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe, thus calling into question the idea that contemporary Russia has any right to dominate those areas. On July 3, 2009, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) approved the Vilnius Declaration, which states that Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, on the basis of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, were equally guilty of unleashing the Second World War. It further endorsed designating August 23 rd (the day the Pact was signed) as a day of remembrance for the victims of Nazism and Stalinism, which the Baltic States had already been celebrating. Lithuania subsequently adopted a law in 2008 to ban both Nazi and Soviet insignia as symbols of oppression. 44 By equating Nazism with communism, the Red Army with the German Army, and Nazi conquest with Soviet liberation, Estonia and Latvia, along with all of Eastern Europe as supported by the OSCE, challenge the legacy of the Great Patriotic War as having freed them from totalitarian rule. 45 They therefore feel no debt to Russia today, which Putin and Russian nationalists find offensive.
legIslatIVe attemPts to defend the legacy
Between 2009 and the present, at least half a dozen legislative measures have been introduced into the State Duma to criminalize defamation of the state's heroic version of the war. Suggested punishments ranged from fines, deportation, and up to five years in prison. So far none have passed into law. Every attempt to pass such laws erupts into a storm of protest, which highlights opposing viewpoints, and is exactly what Putin does not want. 46 In May 2009, as a reaction to the events in the Baltic States, President Medvedev set up a commission to investigate and analyze attempts to "falsify history against the interests of Russia." 47 Simultaneously, the State Duma drafted a bill that would enable the state to punish people for "distorting the verdicts of the Nuremburg Trials," or rehabilitating the Nazis or "calling the actions of the Allied countries a crime."
48 Some commentators believed Prime Minister Putin and his allies were behind the legislation, which some saw as a move to pressure educators and archivists to not challenge the state's evolving interpretation of the legacy of World War II.
Nevertheless, as acts of defiance, groups inside Russia such as Memorial continue to print ugly and complicated truths about the war that challenge Putin's version and indeed give strength to the views of the victims repressed by Stalin at home and abroad. For example, Memorial published an article on the 75 th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in which it labeled the Pact criminal and immoral for enabling the arrest and deportation of massive numbers of people from the Baltic States. 49 Russian liberals insist on seeing the magnitude of the losses not as making the victory more glorious, but the Stalinist government more guilty. Rather than heroes, they cast the soldiers and suffering society as victims.
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The proposed law also sought to reach beyond Russia's borders. If a country was found to promote or tolerate the denigration of the Soviet victory or comment favorably on the Nazis or German occupation, its ambassador could be expelled and diplomatic relations severed. Russians living abroad would be held accountable as well as foreign citizens, who would be declared persona non grata. Russians and foreigners alike, if convicted in Russia, were to be subject to serving from three to five years in prison. Public reaction to the proposed legislation was mixed. When polled, younger and more highly educated Russians expressed opposition to the law, while older and less educated Russians favored it. 51 In fact, the legislation was not approved, but an air of self-censorship continues to pervade Russian publishing houses. In February 2013, a member of the Belarusian Culture Partnership in Irkutsk was sentenced to eight months in prison for making pro-Nazi statements of a racial nature on his social media site with the intent of inciting violence. While not directly related to the idea of defending the image of the Great Patriotic War, the presence of "Nazi-like symbols" was repeatedly highlighted in the case. 52 On the heels of this case another law was proposed to punish the "rehabilitation of Nazism," with fines of varying weight depending on the extent to which the perpetrator went to propagate the pro-Nazi views or defamation of the actions of the "anti-Hitler coalition." As expected, journalists and anti-Stalin civic groups protested this proposal. 53 In another, though rather delayed response to the Baltic States' revisionist interpretation of the legacy of World War II, Russia's State Duma, in September 2013, drafted a law to begin payment of allowances to the approximately 12,000 former Red Army soldiers now residing in the Baltic States, who are veterans of the war. Latvia protested the wording of the preface to the draft law, which read, "Through the will of the political elite of the focus countries [the Baltic States], the defenders of the homeland [veterans] were suddenly turned into 'occupiers,' who would often be subject to prosecution. This happens amid the glorification of former Waffen SS units, as well as local Nazi collaborators by the authorities of Vilnius, Riga and Tallinn."
54 Such language could be construed as a threat by Russia to intervene to defend the rights of Russians in the near abroad as they have done in Ukraine. Undeterred, as soon as the Russian draft law became known, several monuments to Soviet soldiers in Lithuania were vandalized, being spray-painted in the colors of the Lithuanian flag-yellow and blue.
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Like the Baltic States, Ukraine has begun the process of revising the Russian version of World War II by issuing new textbooks that have eliminated the term "Great Patriotic War" and replaced it with "Second World War." The textbooks include positive coverage of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). It describes them as fighters for Ukrainian freedom against the Soviet re-imposition of power after the German withdrawal. Similarly, Georgia and Uzbekistan have been in the process of de-Sovietizing themselves for years, renaming towns and removing Soviet-era monuments, including those memorializing the Great Patriotic War. As in Lithuania, those that the government has yet to remove have been subjected to vandalism. 56 It is clear that Putin has abjectly failed to coerce these former Soviet republics into accepting the Russian version of the war and with it Russia's right to dictate policy to them. Instead, they work to contradict Putin's version under his very nose in full view of the Russian public and defy his foreign policy. Farther afield, the Polish government has been removing Soviet-era monuments for the past several years. In Bulgaria, those monuments too large to move are regularly defaced, some with a touch of humor; in Sophia, the Red Army soldiers depicted on a monument were painted to resemble Santa Claus, Ronald MacDonald, and various American cartoon heroes and villains.
conclusIon
The Russian government's attempt to define the legacy of the Great Patriotic War as one supportive of unity, shared sacrifice, and patriotic valor, is undermined by widespread ignorance of the history of the war, freedom of speech and the press, and access to alternative sources of information, which enables conflicting interpretations of the legacy. In this age, because people have so many options for information and entertainment there is a lot of competition for their attention. There are so many different political parties that no single interpretation of the Great Patriotic War legacy can satisfy everyone, or even the majority. In some ways the attempts to keep the legacy alive is a handicap, especially in the areas of finance and public confidence in the state's ability or willingness to fulfill its promises to veterans.
The Great Patriotic War once stood unchallenged as the greatest accomplishment of the Russian-led Soviet Union, and its legacy formed the basis of a positive common identity. But now this interpretation is contested on the political right in the form of: Skin-heads adopting Nazi wardrobe, symbols, and slogans, openly expressed anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim sentiments with Nazi racial undertones, and the national socialist political movement. Also on the right, the Russian Orthodox Church has its own take on the legacy that challenges the supremacy of the state in the victory. On the left the legacy is challenged by prodemocracy, anti-communist, anti-Stalinist, anti-Putin liberals. Further to the left, communists want to fully rehabilitate Stalin as a great wartime leader and savior of the nation as though that absolves him of all his misdeeds. The legacy is disputed from abroad with Europe and the Baltic States equating the Nazis and Soviets as equals in oppression. The greater part of the post-Soviet generation of Russians is simply not invested in the legacy of the war. Their parents are wearied by it. In sum, Putin is failing in his efforts to use the legacy of the war as a unifying shibboleth for today's Russia.
